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‘Collective intelligence’ is defined as the capacity of human communities to cooperate
intellectually in creation, innovation and invention. As our society becomes more and
more knowledge-dependent, this collective ability becomes of fundamental importance.
It is therefore vital to understand, among other things, how collective intelligence pro-
cesses can be expanded by digital networks. It is one of the keys to success for modern
societies.
Pierre Lévy is one of the world’s leading thinkers, not only in the vast area of cyber-
culture, but also in the fundamental field of knowledge and its processes. He was essen-
tially the first to focus research on collective intelligence when it became a determining
factor in the competitiveness, creativity and human development of knowledge-based
societies.
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Michael Peters (MP): May I call you ‘Pierre’? Can you tell us something about your edu-
cation, especially over the three institutions of your experience as a graduate? What were
the strong influences from this period in terms of philosophers and philosophy?
Pierre Lévy (PL): Yes you may (and I will call you Michael). During the second half of the
1970s, I studied History at the Sorbonne in Paris, where I received a strong influence from
the French school of history called L’école des annales. These historians were interested in
long-term trends, quantitative and anthropological history (as opposed to biographies,
diplomacy and military history). But I was already reading a lot of philosophy for
myself, mainly the classics, with a particular interest in epistemology. So, I was delighted
to discover that one of my favorite contemporary French philosophers, Michel Serres, was
teaching in history (of science) at the Sorbonne. I followed his courses first as a regular
student and then as a free follower during almost 15 years. I did my master’s thesis on
Communication, knowledge and teaching in the computer age (1979) under his ‘supervision’
(I use the quotation mark because he left me completely free) and I became one of his col-
laborators for several projects (books, report for the French government, etc.). I liked his
encyclopedic knowledge of hard sciences and the way he connected humanities and
natural sciences through information theory and structural isomorphisms. Bruno Latour
and Isabelle Stengers were some of the main scholars in his circle.
My second master in philosophy was Cornelius Castoriadis, who was teaching at the
EHESS and ‘supervised’ my PhD thesis on The Idea of Liberty in Ancient Greece. I chose
this subject in order to improve my knowledge of the classics and also because the
notion of free will has always been an enigma to me. So I wanted to know how this idea
was problematized at the beginning of the philosophical tradition. Here again, I was left
without any other guidance than what I learned from Castoriadis seminars at the
EHESS, which I followed during several years, even after having finished my PhD. Castor-
iadis was a psychoanalyst, a (post-Marxist) economist and a philosopher. His thinking
revolved around the idea of historical creation: the surprising emergence of new natural
or cultural forms that could not be deduced from previous facts and logical thinking.
There is a ‘magmatic’ quality in being that traditional rationality cannot grasp. During
the time when I followed his seminar, he was revisiting the emergence of philosophy
and democracy in ancient Greece (by the way, he was a Greek himself). The Greek
miracle was precisely an example of the creative historical imagination that he was
trying to understand.
Trying to list all my influences would be futile, I remember Foucault, Edgar Morin,
Jean-François Lyotard, Baudrillard… all people that I met personally, following their
seminars, discussing with them in conferences. My biggest influences in addition to
Serres and Castoriadis were certainly Deleuze and Guattari. I have read all their books,
























either written by one of them or by both. Their common masterpiece is certainlyMille Pla-
teaux that had a huge influence on me. I had a small correspondence with Deleuze about
my books on collective intelligence and the virtual. He liked the fact that I used their con-
cepts ‘while giving them other determinations’. I developed also a friendship with Guattari
during his last years. He was a deeply original thinker that encouraged me into free enquiry
and disregard for academic consensual intellectual conservatism (that often disguise itself
under the mask of progressism).
Through the research group on ‘the origin of self-organization theories’, gathered by
Jean-Pierre Dupuy around his laboratory at the Polytechnic School in Paris, I came to
know Fransisco Varela, Henri Atlan, and even Heinz von Foerster (who was still living
at the time) without forgetting the diverse trends of American cognitive sciences, who’s
leaders were often invited in France… .
MP: I must say that your educational background is a very rich environment for pursuing a
philosophy of technology: Serres, Castoriadis, Deleuze and Guattari. Already I can see the
significance of your early engagement with information and communication theory
through the lens of these thinkers. (It gives it an historical and philosophical intonation
that seems characteristic of your work.) Can you describe for us the moment when you
first conceptualized the notion of ‘collective intelligence’ within a digital setting? When
did you first come across this idea and when did you realize that it was a seminal
concept that could carry all the weight you wanted to place on it? I am asking for a brief
sketch of the history of your engagement with the concept.
PL: First, I should give a brief definition of collective intelligence. It is a scientific, technical
and political project that aims to make people smarter with computers, instead of trying to
make computers smarter than people. So, collective intelligence is neither the opposite of col-
lective stupidity nor the opposite of individual intelligence. It is the opposite of artificial
intelligence. It is a way to grow a renewed human/cultural cognitive system by exploiting
our increasing computing power and our ubiquitous memory.
I discovered progressively the many layers and connections of this idea as I pursued my
theoretical investigation on humanities and computing in my books La Machine Univers
(1987), Les technologies de l’intelligence (1990) and L’idéographie dynamique (1991). But
the idea came also from my field studies and my practical experience in software design
and education reform. These experiences are described in my books De la programation
considérée comme un des beaux-arts (1992) and Les arbres de connaissances (1992).
Let’s begin with the theoretical investigation. In La Machine Univers, I wanted to show
that computing does not come from another planet but has deep cultural connections in
the Western scientific and philosophical tradition and also in the contemporary esthetic
and epistemologic mindset. The birth of automatic computing in the middle of the twen-
tieth century was the result of a long cultural enterprise to formalize and augment human
intellectual operations. I verified by myself during this work the parallel course of math-
ematics, technology, art and other cultural forms that Michel Serres was pointing out in
his teachings. In Les Technologies de l’Intelligence, inspired by the concept of intellectual
technologies of Jack Goody, I forged the notion of ‘cognitive ecosystem’. I described the
new cognitive ecosystem that could emerge from automatic computing and
























telecommunications. I forecasted the growth of collaborative environments and the gener-
alization of hypertexts (it was before the Web!). Finally, L’ideographie dynamique summar-
izes a reflection on languages and semiotic systems and their role in cognition. What could
be the dynamic interactive writing system of the twenty-first century? What writing system
will be invented after the establishment of the algorithmic medium?
I would not have discovered the concept of digital based collective intelligence without two
important practical experiences. First, I was involved during the late 1980s and the early
1990s in several projects of ‘expert systems’, where I practiced knowledge engineering and
studied in several fields the formalization of knowledge and its transformation into data
and algorithms. I realized that what was called ‘artificial intelligence’ at the time was in
fact a very powerful medium to share and mobilize human knowledge. This is explained
in De la programmation considérée comme un des beaux-arts. Second, I participated to a
[French] government think tank working on educational reform. Our team came with
the utopian project of an open knowledge space emerging from the learning paths of the
real people instead of an a priori hierarchy of prerequisites. And the only way to map
such an open dynamic contextual emerging knowledge space was through software and
telecommunications (again, this was in 1991 and 1992, which means before the Web).
Needless to say, the government refused our proposal… .
The concept of a new personal/collective cognitive system based on cyberspace finally
cristallized when I studied The Guide for the Perplexed by Maïmonides in 1993 and, more
generally, the whole aristotelian and neoplatonic tradition centered on the active intellect.
This was ‘the moment’. The medieval philosophers (Muslims, Jews and Christians alike)
had meditated during centuries on an entity at the interface of the transcendant and the
immanent. This interface—the active intellect—encompassed the whole of human intelli-
gence! I just had to reverse the top-down fall of intellectual light from the heights of the
divine onto humanity. In the new algorithmic medium, collective intelligence would
emerge bottom-up from the multitude of actual human knowledge.
MP: I like this formulation: ‘people smarter with computers rather than computers smarter
than people’ because it gives imparts a politics of agency and also seems on a par with seg-
mented intelligence. I also now understand the ‘deep cultural roots’ in the Western philo-
sophical tradition of computing to ‘to formalize and augment human intellectual
operations’—from Aristotle’s syllogisms, and Leibniz’s calculating machines to Berners-
Lee’s ‘social machines’. In the paragraph that mentions Jack Goody and Michel Serres
you mention aspects of your developing theoretical approach: the concept of the cognitive
ecosystem, ‘the growth of collaborative environments and the generalization of hyper-
texts’, and the role of language and semiotics in cognition, leading to the concept of
digital based collective intelligence. In this connection you ask the question: ‘What writing
system will be invented after the establishment of the algorithmic medium?’ Can I ask
you to reflect further on this question for our readers especially on the definition and sig-
nificance of algorithms?
PL: The emerging medium has interesting features. It makes the whole mass of human
symbols ubiquitous, interconnected and automatically transformable. The algorithms
are the abstract robots that fetch, translate, and modify information for us. An algorithm
























is a series of instructions to an automatic computer. It is an abstract structure that can be
expressed in many different programming languages. Algorithms give the new medium its
distinct character (automation of transformation), as compared to mass media (auto-
mation of copy) or static writing (self conservation). The majority of our symbolic
systems are inherited from the age of static writing and mass media. Hyperlinked social
media and videogames are the forerunners of the symbolic revolution ahead. The next gen-
eration of writing systems will help us to filter, categorize, evaluate, analyze, visualize and
generate flows of data. They will have the power of programming languages and the
nuances of natural languages.
MP: In a condensed last paragraph you touch on Maïmonides and the ‘active intellect’.
Can I ask you to elaborate for us?
PL: In his Metaphysics Aristotle defines the divinity as ‘thought thinking itself’. This
supreme self-reflexive thought was for him the ‘prime mover’ that inspires the eternal
movement of the cosmos. In De Anima, his book on psychology and the theory of knowl-
edge, he states that, under the effect of an active intellect separate from the body, the
passive intellect of the individual receives intelligible forms, a little like the way the
senses receive sensory forms. Starting from the enigmatic propositions of Aristotle’s theol-
ogy and psychology, a whole lineage of Peripatetic and Neo-Platonic philosophers—first
‘pagans’, then Muslims, Jews and Christians—developed the discipline of noetics, which
speculates on the divine intelligence and its relation to human. Our theosophists imagined
a series of mediations between the transcendant knowledge of God and the partial and
transitory knowledge of Man. At the lower end of a series of skies (or ‘angels’), the
active intellect provides communication between the celestial worlds emanating from
god and mortal humanity dispersed in time and space. The active intellect sends to
humans the intelligible categories that inform their passive intellect, but each one of
them receive only a small part of it. So the medieval philosophers had already thought
the actual living unity of human knowledge, despite our scattering in space and time. I
think that we should keep this idea, except that the all encompassing living unity of knowl-
edge should be conceptualized as emerging socially and technically from human multi-
tudes via the new algorithmic medium. Instead of an active intellect broadcasting its
forms from God, we will have an emerging virtual world of ideas that will be accessible
to all.
MP: In terms of the biological realm now routinely scientists talk of ‘swarm intelligence’
and ‘social insects’, ‘flocks’, ‘schools’, that seem to imply a mammalian basis for collective
intelligence also. Can I anticipate you by asking about the evolutionary development of
collective intelligence and what it might evolve?
PL: Of course, collective intelligence is a property of animal societies. Human collective
intelligence is itself rooted in the collective intelligence of societies of apes. Ethological
studies on ape societies gives us many indications on this topic. The first specifically
human collective intelligence was probably organized around the mastering of the fire,
one or two millions years ago. The real take off of human collective intelligence followed
























the development of language, tools and complex institutions 200,000 years ago. Human
beings are symbol manipulators, and they do it collectively. After the development of
language, each new medium expended further the cognitive power of our species: more
and more elaborate writing systems, mechanical then electronic mass media and finally
computing… .
Distribution and increase of computing power will lead to the democratization of algor-
ithm creation and data analysis. In cognitive terms, the direction of this evolution is an aug-
mentation of reflexivity. Complete transparency is probably impossible, and not even
desirable. But we will be more aware of the available knowledge, of its human sources,
of the networks of relations between people and people, people and ideas, ideas and
ideas. We will be able to observe our collective cognitive processes and to understand
more precisely how we think and act together. I foresee for the next centuries an epistemic
revolution in the human sciences that will dwarf the revolution of natural sciences that took
place between the seventeenth and twentieth centuries. The spiritual, esthetic, political
and economic consequences of this growth of reflexive collective intelligence cannot
even be imagined today.
MP: I would like to pick up on the evolution of writing systems from alphabetic and scribal
to mechanical, and from mechanical to electronic, and finally into the stage of computing.
Why do you focus on writing systems as an index of evolutionary development of collective
intelligence, rather than say speech or language?
PL: Because the ability to speak is innate in the human being. It is part of the brain that
every one of us has at his (or her) birth. We have the same brain than our Homo Sapiens
ancestors back in 200,000 BCE and exactly the same linguistic competence. Of course
natural languages are conventional, but children know naturally how to speak when they
are exposed to language. The most ‘primitive’ societies in terms of technology or political
institutions use languages that are as complex as the languages of the most ‘advanced’
societies. By contrast, writing systems were invented rather late (around 3000 BCE) and
were progressively improved during the rest of human history. Writing systems are not
acquired spontaneously but learned at school and, until the invention of the alphabet, it
was a specialized professional skill. Based on our innate or natural ability to manipulate
symbols (language), the cognitive part of cultural evolution (writing systems and media)
augments our personal and collective memory, our means to access this memory and
our ability to exploit it.
MP: What are the epistemological characteristics of computer-based writing systemsI
think you have already given us some substantial hints concerning its algorithmic
nature. I’m not entirely clear what is a computer-based writing system? I am wondering
whether you might say a little more about this and its implications for education?
PL: Basically, computer-based writing systems allow you to give orders to a dynamic sym-
bolic environment. The simplest example is the ‘like’ on Facebook. By ‘liking’, you
command some algorithms that control your news feed: the kind of information that
will be sent to you, the people from whom you’ll receive news, etc. Hypertextuality is
























another example: by clicking, you command the next display of a database. Programming
languages are currently the most powerful of these computer-based writing systems
because they give you total control on computers. But they are difficult to learn and
they correspond to a specialized professional skill rather than to a general cognitive
empowerment of the population. It should be clear that computer-based writing systems
are currently in their infancy. In the future, we will be able to enrich the collective
memory on line and to control what we receive from it in a much more precise way and
without being obliged to master a specialized professional skill. From an educational
point of view, ‘learning to write’ in the algorithmic medium means something different
than ‘learning to write’ in a typographic medium. It implies not only building a visual
sequence of characters (or images) in order to make sense directly for other human
fellows, but also sending commands to complex algorithmic systems in order to
augment and transform collaboratively a common memory. We should begin to tackle
this new educational challenge.
MP: I am guessing that e-writing and e-reading are part of the new algorithmic environ-
ment that embraces a new immateriality of texts and images that provide collective experi-
ences along the whole spectrum from consciousness, awareness, and intelligence to
collective responsibility and action within dynamic symbolic environments. I wonder
about a number of aspects that I hope I can get you to speculate about: (i) the diversity
of thought within these dynamic environments (and resistance), and the related notion
of technological convergence and singularity; (ii) the shift from text to (moving) images;
(iii) the related shift to mobile ubiquity.
PL: The Internet has given a big boost to freedom of expression because people can post
what they want in their blogs or in social media for free and without being obliged to get the
approval of publishers or editors in chief. In addition, we are able to watch and read every-
thing that is published on line, whatever the countries and cultures of the authors (if we
know the languages, of course). The immediate consequence is an augmentation of the
available diversity of information and ideas. Now the problem is to promote an education
that will help people to make a competent and responsible use of all this diversity. The risk
of being locked in an ‘information bubble’ because of algorithms that give you more of the
same and confirm your prejudices is real. There is no other solution than (a) an open and
exploratory online behavior and (b) an effective exercise of personal thinking. Call this
‘resistance’ if you want.
About the singularity (in a Kurzweilian sense) I don’t believe that algorithms will evolve
by themselves and even less that ‘robots will take power’. Let’s not reify the technology.
Algorithms are the extensions of the human symbolic faculty and in no way an auton-
omous power.
I don’t see a real shift from text to moving image but rather a powerful growth of both
toward interactivity, generativity and hypertextuality. It would be useful to consider the
‘text’ in its very general sense of symbolic arrangement, including image, music, etc.
From the fifteenth century to the twenty-first century the text has evolved in the direction
of ubiquity, portability, movement and automation.
























MP: Another question where does politics figure in the evolution of writing and especially
in its new forms in the algorithmic environment?
PL: This is an immense question. I can give you only some brief indications. The scribal
writing systems were adapted to Palace-Temple power structures, like in the Pharaonic,
old Mesopotamian or pre-Confucean China. The literate writing systems (alphabetic or
post-Confucean Chinese ideography) were the tools of ‘universal’ empires including net-
works of cities, money, big bureaucracies, etc. Think of Persian, Greek, Roman, Arabic or
Chinese empires. The printing press and the unidirectional electronic media supported the
invention and the development of the nation state between 1450 and 2000. The new pol-
itical power structures based on the algorithmic medium are still to come, but we can
already guess what they will look like. Their actual part will be networks of ‘smart’ metro-
polis where people, sensors and robots will exchange information constantly. Their virtual
part will consist in the collective intelligence of their population. Let’s call this new power
structure the swarm-state. There will be political and military struggles between these inter-
twined swarm-states for regional and global dominance. We can also predict internal con-
flicts where political parties will be aligned on epistemological positions. Social domination
will be a function of cognitive speed and exploitation of memory… .
MP: Pierre, thank you.
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